In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Holden at Abuja
On Friday, the sixth day of March, 2026
Before their Lordships
Mohammed Lawal Garba
Tijjani Abubakar
Haruna Simon Tsammani
Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru
Jamilu Yammama Tukur
Justices, Supreme Court
SC/CV/50/2018
Between
Union Bank of Nigeria PLC Appellant
And
1. Prince Nwokocha Ezikpe
(Trading below the identify and elegance of
Felimex Mercantile Nigeria Alliance)
2. Felimex Nigeria Limited Respondents
(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Mohammed Lawal Garba, JSC)
Facts
Between May 1982 and January 1983, the Appellant, appearing on the instruction of the Respondents, debited the 2nd Respondent’s account with the Naira equal of US$217,381.05, for remittance to their abroad enterprise companions as cost for items provided. The remittance was to be made in accordance with the related overseas trade rules, which required all funds in overseas trade to be made by the Central Bank of Nigeria upon an software by a home financial institution. Accordingly, the Central Bank of Nigeria would situation promissory notes in favour of the Respondents’ overseas enterprise companions. However, the funds weren’t remitted, prompting the Respondents to make inquiries via letters and visits to the Appellant’s places of work. The situation, nonetheless, remained unresolved.
Consequently, the Respondents commenced an motion on the trial court docket by a Writ of Summons filed on twentieth August, 2008, looking for the restoration of the sum of US$217,381.05 or its Naira equal; curiosity at 19.5% each year on the sum claimed, from January 1983 till remaining liquidation; ₦5 million basically damages for breach of contractual banking obligations; and the prices of the motion.
In its Amended Statement of Defence, the Appellant contended that the motion was statute-barred as at twentieth August, 2008, when the Writ of Summons was issued. The trial court docket, however, entered judgement in favour of the Respondents and granted the reliefs sought. Dissatisfied with the choice, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which court docket affirmed the choice of the trial court docket, and dismissed the attraction.
Issues for Determination
1. Whether the Respondents’ motion is statute-barred, having regard to when their reason for motion arose, and once they grew to become conscious that the Appellant had did not remit the debited funds.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was proper to carry that Exhibits D3 and D5 constituted documentary rumour, and that the Appellant had did not adduce credible proof that the funds deducted from the Respondents’ account had been remitted to the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Arguments
On situation one, the Appellant argued that the Respondents’ motion is statute-barred as a result of the reason for motion arose in 1983 or, on the newest, in 1987, when the first Respondent grew to become conscious that the Appellant had did not remit the debited funds to their overseas enterprise accomplice. Counsel submitted that an motion instituted outdoors the limitation interval is invalid and deprives the court docket of jurisdiction to entertain it, counting on Abubakar v Michelin Motor Tyre Services Ltd (2020) LPELR-50832 (SC); Bello v Yusuf & Ors (2019) LPELR-47918 (SC). The Appellant contended additional, that the decrease courts erred in holding that the reason for motion arose on 14th March, 2005, when the Respondents allegedly obtained a letter from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), confirming that it had no proof of the Appellant’s remittance. That the first Respondent had admitted below cross-examination that he knew way back to 1983 or, on the newest, 1987, that the funds had not been remitted. The Appellant emphasised that the failure of the Respondents to demand a refund till 2004 demonstrated that that they had slept on their rights, and that their motion was statute-barred.
Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the decrease court docket had misapplied Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v Umeodeagu (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 890), because the info of that case had been materially completely different from these of the current attraction. He argued that CBN’s letter of 14th March, 2005, offered no new info, because the Respondents had recognized since 1987 that the funds had not been remitted. He maintained that the reason for motion due to this fact, accrued in 1987, and was statute-barred when the motion commenced in 2008. He relied on the Union Bank case and Adejumo v Olawaiye (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1421) 252, to submit that the Respondents did not discharge their burden below Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 to show, via credible proof, when their reason for motion arose.
Finally, Appellant argued that the transaction didn’t contain a money deposit or credit score transaction and due to this fact, didn’t create a debtor-creditor relationship between the Appellant and the Respondents. He submitted {that a} banker turns into a debtor to its buyer solely in respect of funds credited to the shopper’s account, counting on Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Akabueze (1997) LPELR-429 (SC).
Arguing situation two, the Appellant submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the choice of the trial court docket to deal with Exhibits D3 and D5 as documentary rumour and deny them probative worth. He submitted that DW1, though was neither the maker of the displays nor an officer of the Debt Management Office, might validly tender the paperwork in proof. He contended Exhibit D3 was admissible below Section 82(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011, because the maker’s attendance might be distributed with to keep away from undue delay or expense, significantly for the reason that doc merely defined the contents of Exhibit D5. She argued that Exhibit D5, being a part of the Appellant’s enterprise data, might be tendered by any officer of the financial institution pursuant to Sections 41 and 51 of the Evidence Act 2011, counting on Jubril v FRN (2018) LPELR-43993 (CA). The Appellant posited additional that Exhibit D5, being a licensed public doc, didn’t require the maker to tender it, counting on Section 105 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Onochie & Ors v Odogwu & Ors (2006) LPELR-2689 (SC). He maintained that the doc loved the presumption of regularity below Sections 146 and 168 of the Evidence Act 2011, counting on Okelola v Adeleke (2004) LPELR-2438 (SC). Accordingly, he urged that Exhibits D3 and D5 be admitted, and correctly evaluated as proof that the Appellant had remitted the Respondents’ funds to the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that promissory notes had been issued to their overseas enterprise companions.
The Respondents, on their half, submitted on situation one which their reason for motion accrued in 2005, once they obtained affirmation from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) that the Appellant had did not remit the Naira equal of US$217,381.05 deducted from the Respondent’s account. They submitted that, earlier than receiving the CBN’s letter, they couldn’t confirm who was liable for the lacking funds, because the Appellant had repeatedly knowledgeable them that the matter was below investigation. They contended that the first Respondent didn’t admit that the Appellant had did not remit the funds in 1983 or 1985, however maintained that the Appellant’s accountability was confirmed solely in 2005. Counsel argued additional that Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v Umeodeagu (Supra) is relevant to the circumstances of the case, and urged the Supreme Court to carry that the motion commenced in 2008 was not statute-barred. The Respondents submitted additional {that a} banker-customer relationship existed between the events, and that the sum of US$217,381.05 constituted a debt repayable by the Appellant upon demand, counting on Sani Abacha Foundation v UBA (2010) 41 NSCQR 360. That the Respondents formally demanded compensation in 2005, however the Appellant continued to hunt time to resolve the matter, necessitating the graduation of the motion in 2008. Accordingly, they maintained that the Respondents’ declare for restoration of the debt was not statute-barred.
On situation two, the Respondents argued that the Appellant adduced no documentary or oral proof to determine that it remitted the funds deducted from the 2nd Respondent’s account to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), for cost to the Respondents’ overseas enterprise companions. He submitted that Exhibit D3 was admitted in proof, however rightly accorded no probative worth as a result of it constituted rumour, as DW1 who tendered it was neither a employees member of the CBN nor the Debt Management Office, and couldn’t set up the reality of its contents. The Respondents additionally argued that Exhibit D3 was produced through the pendency of the go well with, opposite to Section 83(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act.
Court’s Judgement and Rationale
Deciding situation one, the Supreme Court held that a reason for motion accrues when all the fabric info needed to determine the Claimant’s proper to sue have occurred, and there’s a competent occasion towards whom the motion could also be introduced. In contractual disputes, the reason for motion arises when the breach happens, and the Claimant turns into entitled to hunt judicial aid – Egbe v Adefarasin (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1; Savannah Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v Pan Atlantic Shipping & Transport Agencies Ltd (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 49) 212.
The Supreme Court reiterated that, the start line for figuring out whether or not an motion is statute-barred is the Claimant’s originating course of, significantly the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. The court docket should establish when the reason for motion arose, and examine that date with the date the motion commenced. If the motion was instituted outdoors the relevant statutory limitation interval, it’s statute-barred – Araka v Ejeagwu (2000) 15 NWLR (PT. 692) 684.
On the relevant limitation interval, Their Lordship held that Section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State gives that an motion based on a easy contract should be introduced inside six years from the date the reason for motion accrued. His Lordship, Garba JSC, additional defined that limitation legal guidelines serve the general public curiosity in bringing litigation to an finish, based mostly on the precept of interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. On the info establishing the attraction, the Supreme Court identified that the Respondents’ pleadings and proof admitted the next materials info, which revealed that the Respondents found the non-remittance in 1983, whereas the CBN confirmed it in 1987. Despite contacting the Appellant, they produced no documentary correspondence between 1983 and 1987, and solely renewed their demand in 2004 and 2005.
The regulation is that, within the consideration of whether or not an motion is statute barred, negotiation by events doesn’t forestall or cease the time restricted for submitting an motion from operating. Even the place there’s trade of correspondence and negotiation is on between events, the time doesn’t cease operating from the date the reason for motion accrued – A.G. Adamawa State v A.G. Federation (2014) 14 NWLR (PT. 1428) 515; Aba v Board of Directors, NIPOST (2023) 5 NWLR (PT. 1878) 475.
The court docket reasoned additional that, as soon as the Respondents found that the Appellant had did not remit the cash they usually needed to make various preparations to pay their abroad associates, all the fabric info essential to institute an motion had been current. Accordingly, the court docket rejected the competition that the reason for motion arose in 2005, however in 1983, when their abroad associates reported non-payment, or, on the newest, in 1987, when the CBN issued its round confirming that the cash had not been remitted. Thus, for the reason that Respondents commenced the motion on twentieth August, 2008, the court docket held that the motion was instituted outdoors the six-year limitation interval prescribed below Section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State. And having been commenced outdoors the prescribed limitation interval, the go well with is incompetent, because the Respondents’ proper to implement the reason for motion via judicial proceedings is extinguished by operation of regulation. Consequently, the court docket lacks jurisdiction to entertain the motion, in keeping with the choice in NPA Plc v Lotus Plastics Ltd (2005) 19 NWLR (PT. 959) 158.
Regarding situation two, the court docket famous that Exhibit D3 was a letter issued by the Debt Management Office (DMO), signed by Hannatu Suleiman, and addressed to the Appellant. Exhibit D5 comprised licensed copies of transaction sheets regarding the CBN’s commerce refinancing train of 1984–1988, hooked up to Exhibit D3.
Both displays had been tendered via DW1, to determine that the Appellant had remitted the sums deducted from the Respondents’ account to the CBN and that promissory notes had been issued to the Respondents’ overseas enterprise accomplice. However, the maker of Exhibit D3 was not referred to as as a witness. Accordingly, the court docket held that the displays certified as rumour proof and had been, due to this fact, inadmissible and lacked probative worth below Sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act – Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (PT. 941) 1. The rationale was that, as a normal rule, a doc ought to be tendered by its maker, who can authenticate its contents and be cross-examined on them. The court docket held additional that the exceptions to the rule towards rumour below Section 39 of the Evidence Act had not been established. There was no proof that Hannatu Suleiman was useless, couldn’t be discovered, was incapable of giving proof, or that calling her would event undue delay or expense. The court docket famous that DW1 might tender Exhibits D3 and D5 solely to determine that the paperwork or statements existed, and to not show the reality of their contents.
Having held that the Respondents’ motion was statute-barred below Section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, and that their proper of motion had been completely extinguished and couldn’t be revived via subsequent authorized proceedings, the court docket ordered the dismissal of the Respondents’ motion, counting on Drexel Energy and Natural Resources Ltd v Trans International Bank Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 388.
Appeal Allowed.
Representation
Dr Kolawole Mayomi and David Andy Essien for the Appellant.
Chief Umeh Kalu, SAN with Chibuike Chima and Others for the Respondents.
Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)
